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ARTICLES
AN HISTORICAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE
PASSAGE RULE IN INTERNATIONAL SALES OF

PERSONAL PROPERTY
Linda Galler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,1 the source of profits from
international sales of personal property was determined solely on the
basis of the location of the sale.' Although the situs of sale rule itselP
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., 1979, Wellesley College; J.D., 1982,
Boston University; L.M., 1986, New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
comments and suggestions of Professors James Hickey and Vern Walker, and Neil Ellis, Maria
Nissan, and Murray Singer, and the research assistance of Allison O'Keefe, Daniel Posener, and
Lisa Shushan Heymann.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. The 1986 Act made substantial changes to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and named the resulting statute the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095. The Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, made some technical and other
changes to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as originally enacted. Unless otherwise indicated,
references herein to sections of the Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, source rules discussed herein pertain to gains, profits, and
income derived from sales of personal property that previously was purchased by the selling taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990); I.R.C. of 1954 §§ 861(a)(6),
862(a)(6). Gains, profits, and income from the sale or exchange of personal property manufactured by the selling taxpayer are sourced pursuant to I.R.C. § 863 (West Supp. 1990) and are
beyond the scope of this Article, except to the extent that the source of such income is determined
by reference to the rules-in I.R.C. § 865 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 361
(1985) (portion of income that is associated with sale is sourced under the general residence-ofthe-seller rule).
3. A sale or exchange within the United States resulted in income from U.S. sources even
where the property had been purchased by the taxpayer outside the United States. I.R.C. of 1954
§ 861(a)(6). The.location of the sale determined the source of the entire proceeds. In re Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B.T.A. 1248 (1927) (profits from sales within the United States of
silk purchased in Japan were sourced entirely in the United States); cf. Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co.
v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 321 (1927), affd, 30 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
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is not particularly complex, years of litigation and administrative examination were required to establish a legal standard for determining
the location of a sale. The courts ultimately concluded that a sale is
deemed to occur at the place at which title to the goods passes from the
seller to the buyer."
In 1984, the Treasury Department proposed that the "title passage
rule" 5 be replaced and that gains be sourced in the country of the
seller's residence. 6 The Treasury Department believed that the source
of gains ought to be the location of the economic activity generating'
the gains, and that the title passage rule failed to accord any significance to this location. In the Treasury Department's view, the rule ena-

bled thoughtful tax planners to manipulate arbitrarily the source of income derived from personal property sales.7 Although the House of
Representatives initially adopted the Treasury Department's proposal
to repeal the title passage rule,8 both houses of Congress ultimately
agreed that a repeal could adversely affect the competitiveness of U.S.
861 (1929); Birkin v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 402 (1926) (entire gain on sales of property within
the United States of property manufactured by the taxpayer outside the United States was from
U.S. sources).
Similarly, a sale or exchange outside the United 'States resulted in non-U.S., or foreign,
source income where the property had been purchased by the taxpayer within the United States.
I.R.C. of 1954 § 862(a)(6). As in the case of income sourced under I.R.C. of 1954 § 861(a)(6),
the location of sale determined the source of the entire proceeds. R.J. Dorn & Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1102 (1928) (profits from sales without the United States of goods purchased
within the United States were treated in their entirety as income from foreign sources).
The situs of sale. rule also controlled where the sale or exchange occurred in the same country
in which the taxpayer had purchased the property. Carding Gill Ltd. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A.
669, 672 (1938); De Stuers v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 201 (1932); cf. Helvering v. Suffolk Co.,
104 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1939); see also P. POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION § 2.15 (1982); P. POSTL'EWAITE , INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION § 2.14
(1980).
4. See, e.g., East Coast Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 558 (1934), affd, 85 F.2d 322
(5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936).
5. Although the rule had been followed administratively and judicially for some time, see
infra notes 94-137 and accompanying text, the rule was first referred to by name in United States
v. Balanovski, 131 F. Supp. 898, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("the place where title passes test"), affd
in part and revd in part, 236 F.2d 198, 305-06 (2d Cir. 1956) ("title passage test," "passage of
title test or rule"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
6. 2 TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 366-67 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]; see also THE
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 402-03
(May 1985) [hereinafter TREASURY IIl.
7. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 365; TREASURY I1,supra note 6, at 399-400.
8. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 611 (as reported by the House Ways and Means
Committee (Dec. 7, 1985)).
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businesses abroad.' Therefore, Congress replaced the title passage rule
only with respect to sales of personal property other than inventory

property; 10 inventory sales continue to be sourced pursuant to title passage principles, at least until the Treasury Department demonstrates to
Congress that a total repeal of title passage would not have a detrimental effect on U.S. trade.11 A Treasury Department study on the issue,
mandated by statute," is several years overdue. 3
The House of Representa tives originally. estimated that a total repeal of the title. passage rule would have increased revenue by amounts

ranging from $170 million in 1986 to $432 million in 1990."' The statute ultimately adopted, which retained the title passage rule for sales of
inventory property, was expected to increase annual revenues by less
than $5 million. 15 These revenue estimates suggest that the title pas9. H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 596 (1986); see also S. REP. No. 313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1986).
10. The term "inventory property" refers to personal property. described in i.R.C.
§ 1221(1) (1988) ("stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business"); I.R.C. § 865(i)(1) (1988).
If a nonresident of the United States maintains an office or other fixed place of business in
the United States, then gains from sales of peisonal property, including inventory, that are attributable to the U.S. office are sourced in the United States, unless the property is sold for use,
disposition, or consumption outside of the United States and the taxpayer's foreign office materially participates in the sale. I.R.C. § 865(e)(2) (1988). Other sales of inventory property by nonresidents are subject to the title passage rule.
11. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-51-4, § 1211, 100 Stat. 2085, 2533. The title
passage rule does not generally apply to sales by nonresidents of the United States. Gains from
sales of personal property, including invent6ry property, by nonresidents of the United States are
sourced in the United States if the sale is attributable to an office or other fixed place of businessmaintained in the United States. I.R.C. § 865(e)(2)(A) (1988). However, the title passage rule
applies to sales of inventory property by nonresidents that are attributable to U.S. offices if the
property is sold for use, disposition, or consumption outside the United States and an office or
other fixed place of business in a foreign country materially participates in the sale. I.R.C.
§ 865(b), (e)(2)(B) (1988). Gains from sales of non-inventory personal property that are not
attributable to a U.S. office are sourced outside the- United States. I.R.C. § 865(a)(2) (1988).
12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1211(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2536; see
also H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 9, at 596.
13. Congress expected the report on or before September 30, 1987. Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1211 (d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2536.- Recognizing that numerous Treasury
Department studies are several years overdue, Congress recently extended the due dates of some
studies and cancelled other studies altogether. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 11831(b), 104 Stat. 1388;,see also H.R, REP. No. 894, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
38 (1990). The due date for the study on the title passage' rule was extended to January 1,1992.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub: L..No. 101-508, § 11831(b), 104 Stat. 1388.
14. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 2, at 365.
15. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 9, at 333.
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sage rule still determines the source of gains from many cross-border
sales of personal property.
In light of Congress's reluctance either to repeal the title passage
rule or to endorse the inventory exception wholeheartedly, it is likely
that Congress will reconsider the issue, particularly because a total repeal would contribute materially to the U.S. fisc. Viewed in proper historical context, however, opportunities to manipulate the source of
gains ought not be viewed with suspicion.
The title passage rule had its genesis in the law of commercial
sales. Judicial opinions that initially adapted the title passage rule from
commercial law regarded risk of loss as the major ingredient of the title
concept."' The title passage rule thus evolved as a risk of loss passage
rule. If the term "title" is understood as connoting risk of loss rather
than mere legal title, then the title passage rule does reflect economic
substance, and any tax advantages resulting from application of the
rule may be justified by the economic risks assumed by the taxpayer.
Consequently, the rule is compatible with the policy objectives articulated by the Treasury Department. 7
Since the title passage rule evolved out of the law of commercial
sales, it is appropriate to question contemporary judicial and administrative reliance on the concept of title, which, in the modern law of
sales, exists largely as an historical footnote. It would be logical at this
time to incorporate into source analysis changes in the law of commercial sales and to recognize explicitly that the passage of risk of loss
from the seller to the buyer ought to determine the source of gains in
international sales of personal property.
The purpose of this Article is (1) to examine the role of the title
passage rule in U.S. taxation of multinational enterprises in light of
international law and jurisdictional legal principles; (2) to urge that
any Congressional reexamination of the rule take into full account both
the historical context in which the rule was created and the policy
forces that contributed to its maturation; and (3) to reconcile judicial
opinions and administrative pronouncements in the tax area with the
abandonment of the title concept in commercial law. It is time for the
courts to explicitly recognize both the centrality of risk of loss passage
and the irrelevance of passage of title and to apply a risk of loss passage rule when determining the source of gains in international sales of
16.
17.

See, e.g., East Coast Oil Co. v. Commislioner, 31 B.T.A. 558, 561 (1934).
See also HR. REP.No. 426, supra note 2, at 360-61.
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personal property. If Congress reexamines the statutory rules for sourcing gains from sales of inventory property, it must recognize that the
title passage rule encompasses a risk of loss passage rule under which
determinations of source of income reflect the economic substance of
the underlying sales transactions, and, therefore, a total repeal of the
title passage rule is not warranted.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE PURPOSE OF SOURCE RULES

To place the title passage rule in context, one must first consider
the true purpose of source rules in the taxation of multinational enterprises and in the application of jurisdictional principles. International
law places few restrictions on sovereign states with respect to national
tax jurisdiction. 8 States have generally accepted restrictions based on
territoriality, where some nexus exists between the state or territory, on
the one hand, and the person, property, or activity generating the income to be taxed, on the other. 9 Further, a nation's ability to enforce
its tax laws effectively must take into account inherent limits on the
exercise of extraterritorial tax jurisdiction in a world of sovereign
equality among states.2 0
With respect to residents, most states exercise taxing jurisdiction
over income from sources both within and without the state. 21 Nonresidents, however, have limited connections with the taxing state and
commonly are taxed only on income linked to economic activities carried on within the territory of the taxing state; the tax base may include income from sources outside the territory, but only if it arises
from the activities conducted within the territory. 2 Some countries
Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30
L.J. 1, 3-4 (1989); K. VAN RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW
21 (1986); Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAX L. REV. 431, 431 (1962).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 and comments a & c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; RESTATEMENT, supra, § 411
comment b; Norr, supra note 18, at 432.
20. Palmer, supra note 18, at 4; Rgdler, Basic Origins of International Double Taxation
and Measures for its Avoidance, reprinted in I E. OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S.
INCOME TAXATION 59, 62-64 (1980).
21. Garbarino, A Study of the International Tax Policy Process: Defining the Rules for
Sourcing Income from Isolated Sales of Goods, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 394 (1988); 65 CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 15-18 (1980) [hereinafter I.F.A. GENERAL REPORT]; see
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 412(1)(a).
22. I.F.A. GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 15-18; K. VAN RAAD, supra note 18, at 2224; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 412(l)(b), (c).
Nonresidents may also be taxed on the basis of source. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a)(1)
(1988) (nonresident aliens and foreign corporations are taxed on certain categories of "fixed or
18.

HARV. INT'L
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choose to limit their jurisdiction by taxing only income arising from
sources within the state. 3
Overlapping exercises of jurisdiction by states often result in
double or even multiple taxation of the same item of income.14 One
method of alleviating the burden of double or multiple taxation is to

accord taxpayers a credit against their domestic income tax where income derived outside the country of residence (the "home country") is
taxed by the country in which it was earned (the "host country"). Jurisdiction to tax on the basis of residence, is generally considered
subordinate to source-based jurisdiction; 25 hence, the host country is
granted primary jurisdiction over income accruing within its borders,
while the home country retains only secondary jurisdiction. 26

A.,

The Role of Source Rules in the United States

Since the source concept described above is central both to the
jurisdictional scope of a state's taxing authority and to procedures for
relieving double taxation, one might expect to find a coherent set of
general principles governing the determination of source. Surprisingly,
there is none. Determinations of source are strictly matters of the domestic law of each individual state. The United States is typical in failing to provide a "unified concept that ties together the separate [sourc-

ing] rules of the overall regime."' 27 Source of income is ascertained for
U.S. income tax purposes first by assigning the income in question to a
determinable annual or periodical" income (so-called "FDAP" income, see Dale, Withholding
Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons, 36 TAX L. REv. 49, 53 n.20 (1980)), that are not effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business, but are derived from sources within the United States).
23. I.F.A. GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21, at, 15-18.
24. Double taxation may also occur where two countries apply different tests in determining
residence or domicile, or source of income.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 413 reporter's note 1.
26. Bilateral tax treaties are another method of minimizing double taxation. These treaties
allocate the conflicting tax claims of two contracting parties in a manner that might otherwise
contradict the domestic sourcing principles of.one or both contracting parties. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kingdom, art.
11, 31 U.S.T. 5668, T.i.A.S. No. 9862 (treaty exempts from taxation U.S. source interest received
by residents of United Kingdom without regard to ownership interest- in payor; conflicts with
I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(3), 881(c)(3)(B) (1988), under.which U.S. source interest received by a 10percent shareholder is not exempt).
In addition, in the United States, most foreign taxes are deductible from gross income in
computing taxable income. I.R.C. § 164 (1988). No deduction is allowed, however, for foreign
taxes with respect to which a foreign tax credit is elected. I.R.C. § 275(a)(4) (1988). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-1(c) (as amended in 1987).
27. Palmer, supra note 18, at 51.
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statutory category and then by applying source of income rules pre28
scribed for that category.
In the context of U.S. income taxation, source of income is relevant primarily in two settings. In the first setting, persons who are residents of the United States 29 are taxed on income from worldwide
sources,"0 but, as one would expect, they are entitled to a corresponding
credit against U.S. tax with respect to foreign taxes on income sourced
abroad."' Foreigners who engage in trade or business in the United
States are taxed on income from worldwide sources that is effectively
connected with the U.S. business,32 and also are eligible for the corresponding credit.33 The importance of the source rules to residents and
foreigners who conduct business in this country, then, lies in the foreign
28. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a), 862(a) (West Supp. 1990).
29. With respect to individuals, residency is determined pursuant to objective rules set forth
in I.R.C. § 7701(b) (1988). Corporations organized under the laws of a foreign country are not
considered residents of the United States. 1.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (a)(30)(C) (1988).
30. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988). U.S. citizens are taxed on worldwide income even when they
are neither domiciled nor resident in the United States. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). "The
government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the benefit complete." Id.. at 56. Asserting jurisdiction to tax citizens,
regardless of residency, is relatively rare. Norr, supra note 18, at 436-37; K. VAN RAAD, supra
note 18, at 19-20 n.4.
31. I.R.C. § 904, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 904). The allowable foreign tax credit
may be less than the actual amount of foreign taxes incurred. See I.R.C. § 904 (1988). See also
infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 901(b) (1988), the following persons are entitled to claim the foreign
tax credit:
a. U.S. citizens and domestic corporations,
b. foreign individuals who are residents of the United States,
c. foreign individuals who are residents of Puerto Rico during the entire taxable
year,
d. foreign individuals who are not residents of the United States and who are engaged in trade or business within the United States,
e. foreign corporations that are engaged in trade or buginess within the United
States, and
f. individuals described in the preceding categories who are members of partnerships
or beneficiaries of estates or trusts which 'pay or accrue eligible foreign taxes.
32. Nonresident aliens and foreign corporations that are engaged in trade or business within
the United States, as a practical matter, are treated as residents for purposes of taxing their
business profits. Thus, income from worldwide sources that is effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business is subject to U.S. tax at the same rates that apply to citizens,
residents, and domestic corporations. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a) (1988).
33. I.R.C. §§ 901(b)(4), 906 (1988). LR.C. § 904 as amended by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 904) may limit the otherwise allowable foreign tax credit. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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tax credit, since the amount of the foreign tax credit is directly related
to the amount of foreign source income derived by the taxpayer.3

In the second setting, the method of taxing nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations depends on the source of income received by the
taxpayer.35 As stated above, foreigners who are engaged in trade or
business within the United States are taxed on income from worldwide
sources that is effectively connected with the U.S. trade or business.3 6

In determining whether an item of income is effectively connected, different rules apply with respect to U.S. source income and foreign
source income.3 7 Nonresidents also are taxed on certain categories of
income from U.S. sources, even if such income is not effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.38
B.

The Role of Source Rules in the United States: The Foreign Tax
Credit Limitation

Citizens, residents, domestic corporations, and foreign persons who
engage in trade or business in the United States (roughly speaking,
those persons who are taxed by the United States on worldwide source

income), are entitled to a credit against U.S. tax if income taxes are
paid or incurred abroad.39 Thus, the United States effectively cedes its

primary jurisdiction to tax U.S. residents on income derived from foreign sources.
In order that any credit does not intrude upon the U.S. tax attributable to U.S. source income, the foreign tax credit is limited to the

proportion of U.S. tax that foreign source taxable income bears to total, or worldwide, income.'

Stated mathematically:

34. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
36. I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(1), 882(a)(1) (1988).
37. I.R.C. § 864(c) (1988). See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
38. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), (2), 881(a) (1988). See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
39. I.R.C. § 901(a) (1988). The foreign tax credit is available only for income, war profits,
and excess profits taxes paid to a foreign country or U.S. possession and for foreign taxes imposed
in lieu of income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid to a foreign country or U.S. possession.
I.R.C. §§ 901(b), 903 (1988). See generally Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REv. 227 (1984).
A domestic corporation that owns at least 10% of the voting stock of a foreign corporation is
treated as if it had paid a share of the foreign taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary in the year in
which its earnings and profits become subject to U.S. tax as dividend income to the U.S. corporate
shareholder. I.R.C. § 902(a) (1988). Thus, a "deemed paid credit" is available to the U.S. corporation. See also I.R.C. § 960(a) (1988) (income included in income by a U.S. shareholder pursuant to subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code is eligible for the deemed paid credit).
40. I.R.C. § 904(a) (1988). Congress described the purpose of the foreign tax credit limita-
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foreign source

foreign tax credit
limitation

taxable income X
worldwide
taxable income

U.S. tax on
worldwide

The foreign tax credit limitation, as determined by the mathematical

formula, is calculated separately with respect to several categories, or
baskets, of income. 1
If the foreign taxes paid or incurred exceed the allowable credit,
the excess, referred to as an excess foreign tax credit, may be treated

as taxes actually paid or incurred, and therefore eligible for credit, in
another taxable year.42 While the credit cannot exceed the aggregate
amount of all foreign taxes paid,'3 the method for calculating the for-

eign tax credit limitation requires the taxpayer to aggregate his income
from all foreign sources without regard to the actual foreign tax paid;

it is irrelevant whether the U.S. tax exceeds or is less than the tax
imposed by any particular foreign country.
tion as, follows:
The income tax law allows a credit, dollar for dollar, against our tax for any income or
profits taxes paid to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States, with
certain modifications in the case of alien residents of the United States. Where foreign
income or profits taxes are imposed at rates higher than those carried by the similar taxes
in this country, this credit may wipe out part of our tax properly attributable to income
derived from sources within the United States. To prevent this abuse, section 228 [of the
Revenue Act of 1921] provides that in no case shall the amount of this credit exceed the
same proportion of our tax which the taxpayer's net income from sources within the United
States bears to his entire net income.
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1921).
41. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (West Supp. 1990). See generally Tarris, Foreign Tax Credit Limitation After Tax Reform. The Separate Limitation Categories and the Application of the LookThrough Rule, 42 TAx LAW. 275 (1989). Prior to the 1986 Act, the foreign tax credit limitation
was calculated separately for two major baskets of income: (I) interest income, and (2) everything
else. I.R.C. of 1954 § 904(d)(l)(A), (E) (there also were separate baskets for DISC and FSC
income, I.R.C. of 1954 § 904(d)(l)(B)-(D)). Congress increased the number of baskets out of
concern that foreign source income subject to a high foreign tax rate was being "averaged" with
foreign source income subject to a low foreign tax rate. S.REP. No. 313, supra note 9, at 302. The
source of certain types of low-taxed income (such as passive interest) could be shifted among tax
jurisdictions with relative ease. Id. at 303.
42. I.R.C. § 904(c) (1988). Excess foreign tax credits may be carried back two years and
forward five years. Id. Unused credits expire at the end of the carryover period. The purpose of
the carryover is to minimize differences between methods of reporting income in the United States
and foreign countries. These differences may result in the same income being reported in one year
in the United States and in another year in the foreign country, creating a disequilibrium between
the timing of income recognition for U.S. tax purposes and the payment of foreign taxes. H.R.
REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., IstSess. 27 (1957).
43. I.R.C. § 901(b) (1988).
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In order to maximize benefits offered by the foreign tax credit, and
thereby minimize U.S. tax liability, simple mathematics offers U.S.
taxpayers two potent planning alternatives."' First, a taxpayer could

increase the numerator in the limitation fraction by shifting income out
of the United States to a jurisdiction with a lower income tax rate than
the United States. Of course, the larger the numerator, the greater the
portion of U.S. tax that would be credited. Second, a taxpayer also
could shift income from one foreign jurisdiction to another that imposes
tax at a lower rate. This shift of income would not affect the dollar

amount of the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation. It would, however,
enable the taxpayer to utilize excess foreign tax credits from other taxable years should the current year's limitation exceed the actual
amount of foreign taxes paid.

Given the ability of U.S. taxpayers to reduce their income tax liabilities simply by shifting the source of income to low-tax or no-tax
jurisdictions, the reduction in U.S. tax rates by the 1986 Act4" to a
level below that of many other industrialized countries increased the
availability of foreign tax creditsto U.S. taxpayers. At the same time,
however, the Act increased the likelihood that excess foreign tax credits
of multinational businesses would' grow, magnifying the need for for46
eign tax credit planning through shifts in income source.
C.

The Role of Source Rules in the United States: Foreign Persons
Unlike U.S. residents, nonresident aliens 47 and foreign corporaare not taxed by the United States on income from worldwide

tions4"

44. Both planning alternatives are subject to the foreign tax credit separate basket limita.tion. See supra note 41.
45. The 1986 Act lowered the maximum rate on corporations to 34% and on individuals to
28 % (both with a 5% surtax at specified levels of taxable income). Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, §§ 101(a), 601(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2096. 2249. The maximum rate on individuals
recently was raised to 31 %, and the 5% surtax on individuals was repealed. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101(a), (b), 104 Stat. 1388.
46.

1 TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,

SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 143 (Nov. 1984); TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 387; S.
REP. No. 313, supra note 9, at 333-34. Congress was acutely'aware of the potential for source
manipulation, however, when it enacted, in the 1986 Act, the interest allocation provisions of
I.R.C. § 864(e) (1988) and the foreign tax credit separate basket limitation provisions of I.R.C.
§ 904(d) (West Supp. 1990), both of which often have the effect of reducing the foreign source
taxable income numerator.
47. The tax imposed by I.R.C. § 1, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.'§ 1) applies to nonresident alien individuals only as provided by I.R.C. §§ 871 & 877 (1988). I.R.C. § 2(d) (1988).
48. The regular tax imposed by I.R.C. § 11 (1988) and the alternative minimum tax im-
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sources. Instead, these persons are taxed only on selected items of income, the source rules playing a determinative role in the selection of

items to be taxed.
As discussed previously, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations who conduct trade or business in the United States49 are treated
as residents of the United States, but only with respect to businessrelated income. These persons are taxed according to the same rules as
are U.S. citizens, residents, and domestic corporations, but only on income that is considered effectively connected with their U.S. busi-

nesses. 50 Income that is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business, thus, is subject to U.S. income tax regardless of the source of
such income."
To determine whether an income item is effectively connected, the
item first must be placed into one of three categories prescribed by the
posed by I.R.C. § 55, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 55) apply to foreign corporations only
as provided by I.R.C. § 882 (1988). I.R.C. § 11(d) (1988).
49. Limited statutory guidance is provided for determining whether activities and contacts
in the United States are, in any instance, regarded as a U.S. trade or business. See I.R.C.
§ 864(b) (1988) (referring only to performance of personal services for a foreign employer and.
trading in securities or commodities). Judicial opinions abound, but provide few if any legal standards, leaving the determination fact sensitive and imprecise. See generally lsenbergh, The
"Trade or Business" of Foreign Taxpayers in the United States, 61 TAXES 972 (1983); Garelik,'
What Constitutes Doing Business Within the United States by a Non-resident Alien Individual or
a Foreign Corporation, 18 TAX L. REv. 423 (1963).
50. I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (1988) (nonresident alien individuals); I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (1988)
(foreign corporations). Prior to the Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539
(1966), the taxation of foreigners was premised on the "force of attraction" principle, under which
the conduct of trade or business in the United States "attracted" all business and investment
(nonbusiness) income. Thus, foreign corporations and nonresident aliens who engaged in trade or
business in the United States were taxed at regular rates on all taxable income from U.S. sources,
even where the income was not connected with the U.S. trade or business. The Foreign Investors
Tax Act abandoned the "force of attraction" principle as it applied to investment (nonbusinessrelated) income. Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, §§ 103(a), 104(a), 80 Stat.
1539, 1547-48, 1555 (1966). Business income continues to be taxed pursuant to "force of attraction" principles. Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, §§ 102(d), 103(a), 104(b), 80
Stat. 1539, 1542, 1547-48, 1555 (1966). See generally S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN. FOREIGN
INVESTORS TAX ACT V S/7B(1) (1967); Jones, Foreign Investors Tax Act-The "Effectively Connected" Concept and Taxation of Domestic Source Income, 26 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 389
(1968).
51. I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(2), 873 (1988) (nonresident alien individuals); I.R.C. § 882(a)(2),
(c) (1988) (foreign corporations). Appropriate deductions may offset the gross amount received,
but generally only to the extent connected with income effectively connected with the conduct of a
U.S. trade or business. I.R.C. §§ 873(a), 882(c)(1)(A).(1988).
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Internal Revenue Code. A separate set of operative rules applies to
each category." The categories are:
(1)

passive or investment (FDAP)53 income
and capital gain and loss from
4

sources within the United States,
(2) all other income from U.S. sources, 56 and
(3) certain specified categories of income from sources without the United
States."

A cursory review of the three categories indicates that whether an income item is effectively connected and, therefore, taxable to a foreign
recipient, depends in the first instance upon the source of the income
item.5
Nonresidents, then, must plan their affairs with respect to both
source and effective connection. These two concepts have tremendous
impact on taxation of gains from sales of personal property, which,
since the 1986 Act, 8 are sourced in the United States if attributable to
an office or other fixed place of business in the United States, unless
(1) the goods are sold for use, disposition, or consumption outside the
United States, and (2) an office or other fixed place of business of the
taxpayer in a foreign country materially participates in the sale."
Thus, source is determined not only by the degree of involvement of the
U.S. office, but also by the ultimate destination of the goods sold. U.S.
source gains from personal property sales fall within the second category described above, and in all events are considered effectively
connected. 0
The title passage rule applies to nonresidents with respect to sales
of inventory property that are not attributable to a U.S. office. 6 ' Non52. I.R.C. § 864(c) (1988).
53. See supra note 22.
54. I.R.C. § 864(c)(2) (1988). The specific items of income included in this category are
listed in I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 871(h), 881(a), 881(c) (1988).
55. I.R.C. § 864(c)(3) (1988).
56. I.R.C. § 864(c)(4) (1988).
57. While an in-depth analysis of the substantive rules applicable to each category is beyond
the scope of this article, an in-depth analysis is provided in Dale, Effectively Connected Income,
42 TAX. L. REv. 689 (1987). See also Stevenson, Is the Connection Effective? Through the Maze
of Section 864, 5 Nw. U. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 213 (1983).
58. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1211(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2533.
59. I.R.C. § 865(e)(2) (1988).
60. I.R.C. § 864(c)(3) (1988).
61. Sales of personal property by nonresidents who do not maintain offices or fixed places of
business in the United States are sourced pursuant to the general rule of IR.C. § 865(a)(2)
(1988). Thus, gains from non-inventory sales are sourced outside the United States, I.R.C.
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residents who sell property to purchasers in the United States, however,

face the risk that minimal presence (including mere use of an agent) in
the United States might constitute an office or fixed place of business to
which sales could be attributable. 2 In that event, gains would be
sourced in the United States and would be taxed as effectively connected income.
In addition to effectively connected income, nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations are also taxed by the United States on statutorily
prescribed categories of passive or investment (FDAP)6 3 income from
sources within the United States."' Gains from sales of personal property that are sourced in the United States are not among the statutory
categories;' 5 thus, such gains may be taxed only if they are effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business.
III.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TITLE PASSAGE RULE

Prior to the 1986 Act, the source of gains from sales of personal
property was determined, as a statutory matter, solely on the basis of
the location of the sale."' This rule continues to apply with respect to
sales of inventory property by U.S. persons.6 7 The question of where a
§ 865(a)(2) (1988), and gains from inventory sales are sourced under the title passage rule.
I.R.C. § 865(b) (1988).
62. The principles of I.R.C. § 864(c)(5) (1988) apply in determining whether a taxpayer
has an office or other fixed place of business in the United States and whether a sale is attributable thereto. I.R.C. § 865(e)(3) (1988). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7 (1972). These rules determine whether an agent of the taxpayer constitutes an independent or dependent agent. In the
latter case, the U.S. place of business of the dependent agent is attributed to the foreign taxpayer.
Cf. Williams, Permanent Establishments in the United States, 29 TAx LAw. 277 (1976) (analyzing tax treaty provisions under which the activities of agents determine permanent establishment
status).
63. See supra note 22.
64. 1.R.C. § 871(a)(l), (2) (1988) (nonresident alien individuals); I.R.C. § 881(a) (1988)
(foreign corporations).
65. There is no statutory provision for taxing non-effectively connected gains from sales of
personal property. With respect to nonresident alien individuals, however, I.R.C. § 871(b) (1988)
purports to tax U.S. source gains if the seller is present in the United States for 183 days or more
during the taxable year of sale. Although it has not been repealed, I.R.C. § 871(b) (1988) became largely obsolete upon enactment of I.R.C. § 7701(b) (1988), which treats as a U.S. resident
an alien individual who is present in the United States for 183 days or more in one taxable year.
See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A) (1988). Since resident aliens are taxed on income from worldwide
sources under Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 1974), gains from sales of personal property
would be subject to U.S. tax regardless of source.
66. I.R.C. of 1954 §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6).
67. I.R.C. § 865(b) (1988). Notwithstanding this general rule, gains derived by nonresidents of the United States from sales of inventory property are sourced in the United States if the
nonresident maintains an office or other fixed place of business in the United States to which the
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sale is located, however, is problematic, and has been the focus of both
judicial and administrative attention, ultimately resulting in the title
68

passage rule.
The history of the title passage rule may be viewed in five distinct

stages, each of which is characterized by a dramatic shift, if not a complete reversal, in the government's position with respect to the appropriate test for locating a sale.
A.

Stage One: 1920-1928

The issue of source arose for the first time following Congressional
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1916,69 which imposed an income tax

71
on the net income of nonresident aliens 70 and foreign corporations
from sources within the United States. 71 Neither the statute nor Congressional committee reports offered any guidance or method for determining the source of a nonresident alien or foreign corporation's in-

come. Treasury Regulations defined source modestly as "the place of
'7
the origin of the income. 3
In interpretive rulings, the Treasury Department initially focused
on the location of the seller's activities in connection with a sale, a con-

centration of activity in the United States being a prerequisite for
sourcing income in this country. Thus, where a foreigner manufactured
goods abroad for sale to U.S. purchasers, gain could not be sourced in
the United States unless the seller's representatives in the United

States contributed to consummation of the sales .7 "The carrying on of
gains are attributable, unless the inventory property is sold for use, disposition, or consumption
outside the United States and an office or other fixed place of business outside the United States
materially participates in the sale. I.R.C. § 865(e)(2) (1988). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., East Coast Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 558, 560 (1934).
69. Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. The Revenue Act of 1916 was amended by the Revenue Act of
1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, which left intact the 1916 provisions pertaining to the taxation of
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, except that the applicable rates increased. Revenue
Act of 1917, ch. 63, §§ 2-3 (nonresident aliens), § 4 (foreign corporations), 40 Stat. 300, 301,
302.
70. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § l(b), 39 Stat. 756, 756.
71. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765.
72. The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, had imposed a tax on nonresident aliens
with respect to net income "from all property owned and of every business, trade, or profession
carried on in the United States by persons residing elsewhere," and on foreign corporations with
respect to net income "accruing from business transacted and capital invested within the United
States." Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ II(A)(1), l1(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 166, 172.
73. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 66 (1918).
74. Law Opinion 502 (unpublished), quoted in A.R.R. 723, 1-1C.B. 113, 115 (1922), de-
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business by a foreign corporation through an office or agent in the
United States [was] an essential of income from 'sources within the

United States.'

"75

The Board of Tax Appeals, in R.J. Dorn & Co. v. Commissioner,'7 6 was the first court to explicitly consider the government's position that the transaction of business in the United States results in U.S.
source income, and the court rejected it. In Dorn, a foreign partnership
consisting of foreign partners maintained an office in New York for the
sole purpose of purchasing goods for resale to non-U.S. purchasers.
Practically all orders were taken from points outside the United States.
Accounts were kept in New York and purchase payments were made in
New York. Where drafts were drawn on customers, they were discounted by a bank located in New York.7
The Board of Internal Revenue argued that partnership profits
were U.S. source because the partnership was transacting business in
the United States.7 8 Rather than focus on the seller, however, the
Board of Tax Appeals in Dorn focused on the nationality or location of
the buyer.7 9 The court's conclusion that partnership profits were foreign
source was based on thi facts that the purchasers were nonresidents
and that the money from which the partnership's income was derived
clared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 78-345, 1978-2 C.B. 346.
75. A.R.R. 723, 1-1 C.B. 113, 115 (1922). Cf. O.D. 651, 3 C.B. 265 (1920) (income
sourced in country where it grows out of a business activity).
76. 12 B.T.A. 1102 (1928), acq., 8-1 C.B. 13 (1929). As the years in issue ended in 1917,
1918, 1920, and 1921, the Dorn case was decided under Revenue Acts of 1916, 1917, 1918, ch.
18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919), and 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
77. Sales were made on a cost, insurance, and freight (C.I.F.) basis. See infra notes 98-99
and accompanying text. As a general rule, in a C.I.F. contract, title passes to the purchaser upon
delivery on board the carrier. I S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE'UNIFORM SALES ACT § 280c, at 607 (1924) [hereinafter WILLISTON].
This principle is not affected by a bill of lading to the seller's order; ownership in this case is
retained only for purposes of securing performance by the buyer. Id. See also UNIF. SALES ACT
§ 20, 1 U.L.A. 363-64 (1950). If the Dorn facts had been analyzed under title passage principles,
then the income in question likely would have been sourced in the United States since title would
have passed when the goods were delivered to carriers in the United States. Cf INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 1990, at 52-53 (1990) [hereinafter INCOTERMs 1990] (in a
C.I.F. contract, seller must "bear all risks of loss of or damage to the goods until such time as
they have passed the ship's rail at the port of shipment" and buyer must "[blear all risks of loss of
or damage to the goods from the time they have passed the ship's rail at the port of shipment").
78. Dorn, 12 B.T.A. at 1106.
79. Id. at 1102. See also In re Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B.T.A. 1248 (1927)
(profits from sales to U.S. residents of silk purchased in Japan were sourced in the United States).
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was received from a foreign consignee; the status of the seller was
largely irrelevant.8 0
Although the Revenue Act of 191881 made some minor changes

pertaining to source determinations, these changes had no effect on the
government's or Board's positions with respect to gains from personal
property sales. Thus, while the government continued to focus on the
location of the taxpayer's selling activities, 82 the Board of Tax Appeals

continued to focus on the nationality or location of the buyer..
Where goods were manufactured in one country for sale to purchasers in another, the Board held on several occasions that the entire
gain was sourced in the country of sale, notwithstanding that the manufacturing process contributed to the value of the goods sold.8 4 Largely
in response to these draconian decisions by the Board,8 5 Congress in-

cluded in the Revenue Act of 1921 a provision for allocating income
between the country of manufacture and the country of sale.8 6 Without
explanation, the 1921 Act also provided for non-allocation where goods
were purchased (as opposed to manufactured) in one country for sale in
another; the gain was "treated as derived entirely from the country in
which sold." 87 Again, Congress offered no guidance for determining the

country in which property was considered sold.
Treasury Regulations promulgated under the 1921 statute de80. Dorn, 12 B.T.A. at 1108. The court also noted that title to the goods remained with the
seller until delivered to the foreign consignee outside the United States. Id. This statement is
inconsistent with principles of commercial law, which treat title in C.I.F. contracts as passing
when the seller delivers the goods to the carrier (here, in the United States). See supra note 77.
81. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 213(c) (nonresident aliens), 233(b) (foreign corporations) 40 Stat. 1057, 1066, 1077 (1919).
82. See T.D. 3111, 2 C.B. 280 (1920). In O.D. 1100, 5 C.B. 118 (1921), the Treasury
Department ruled that profits from sales to U.S. purchasers by a foreign manufacturer resulted in
foreign source income, based largely on the seller's non-U.S. activities. The decision notes, without
foreign country.
ascribing weight thereto, that title -to the goods passed in a
83. Dorn, 12 B.T.A. 1102 (1928). Cf. Billwiller v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 841 (1928)
(gains from sales to U.S. purchasers by foreign manufacturer sourced in United States), aff d, 31
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 866 (1929); accord Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co. v.
Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 321 (1927), afl'd, 30 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 861
(1929); Birkin v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 402 (1926).
84. Billwiller, 11 B.T.A. at 841; Tootal Broadhurst Lee, 9 B.T.A. at 321; Birkin, 5 B.T.A.
at 402.
85. S.REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist. Sess. 16 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., Ist
Sess. 12 (1921).
86. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 244. The current version of this
provision is codified as I.R.C. § 863 (West Supp. 1990).
87. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 244.
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scribed the place of sale as "the place where marketed," 88 a definition
of minimal help when one considers the ambiguity of the term "marketed." In light of the government's pre-1921 position, that location of

the taxpayer's selling activities determined source, one might suppose
that the verb "market" was used in its ordinary sense, i.e., "to expose
for sale in a market."8 9 The Treasury Department's first post-1921 Act
pronouncement, however, referred both to the taxpayer's selling activities and also to the country in which title passed from the seller to the
buyer,991" suggesting another interpretation of the verb "market," i.e.,.to

"sell," and hinting also that the government's previously firm position
was softening.

By 1928,92 the Treasury Department in fact had explicitly interpreted the regulation in the latter fashion, unequivocally adopting the
notion of title passage as the definitive test for determining the country
of sale. In General Counsel Memorandum 2,467,"3 faced with facts
that were virtually identical to those in Dorn,9' the Treasury Department ruled that gains were sourced in the United States since title
passed there,9 5 a ruling that squarely contradicted the result reached in
Dorn.
Where the Dorn court had ignored commercial law concepts
such
as title, 96 and focused instead on the foreign situs of the buyer, the
Treas. Reg. 62, art. 323 (1922).
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1383 (1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY].
90. I.T. 1569, 2-1 C.B. 126 (1923).
91. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 89, at 1383. This interpretation is circular,
however, causing the regulation effectively to read, A la Gertrude Stein: "The place where property is sold is the place where property is sold." Alexander, Where is a Sale Made?, 27 TAXES 133
(1949).
92. Although the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 217(e), 43 Stat. 253, 274, was now the
governing statute, the applicable language was identical. In fact, the language remained the same
in subsequent statutes. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954*changed the terminology slightly, but
retained the substance of the rule. I.R.C. of 1954 §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6).
93. 7-2 C.B. 188 (1928); see also I.T. 2068, 3-2 C.B. 164 (1924).
94. 12 B.T.A. 1102 (1928).
95. Gen. Couns. Mem. 2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188, 195 (1928).
96. The Uniform Sales Act uses the term "property" in relation to goods to express ownership as between seller and buyer, see UNIF. SALES ACT § 17, 1 U.L.A. 309-10 (1950), and the
term "title" in relation to goods to express ownership as against third parties, see UNIF. SALES
ACT § 23, I U.L.A. 379 (1950). As a practical matter, the terms are largely interchangeable.
Whiteside, Uniform Commercial Code-Major Changes in Sales Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 165, 167 n.14
(1960); R. BRAUCHER & A. SUTHERLAND. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: TEXT, FORMS, STATUTES
23 (1958). Cf. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
HARV. L: REV. 561, 566 n.7 (1950); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW &
88.
89.
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Treasury Department wholeheartedly embraced the law of commercial

transactions. Both in Dorn and General Counsel Memorandum 2,467,
sales were made on a cost, insurance, and freight (C.I.F.) basis.97 In a
C.I.F. contract, the price paid by the buyer reflects not only the cost of
the goods but also the cost of insurance and freight procured by the

seller. Since the buyer pays the cost of freight, it is reasonable to suppose that he does so because the goods belong to him. 9" Thus, in C.I.F.

contracts, title passes to the buyer when the seller delivers the goods to
the carrier and forwards the appropriate documents.99 In General
Counsel Memorandum 2,467, title to goods sold to foreign customers
passed at ports in the United States. Therefore, sales were considered
made in the United States and the resulting profits were domestically
sourced. 100
Stage One in the history of the title passage rule, then, was
marked by confusion in interpreting ambiguous statutory rules that
taxed foreigners on gains from sales of goods in the United States, but
provided no legal standards for defining the location of a sale. The gov-

ernment ultimately interpreted the statutory language as referring only
to the country in which title to goods passed from seller to purchaser,
regardless of the level of activity conducted by the seller within or

without the United States. 101
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 n.l

(1951).
97. Some of the sales described in Gen. Couns. Mem. 2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188, 195 (1928) were
made on a cost and freight (C. & F.) basis. Incidence of title passage is the same in contracts
made in accordance with either of these terms. The Hans Maersk, 266 F. 806 (2d Cir. 1920). Cf.
INCOTERMS 1990, supra note 77, at 46-47 (in a C. & F. contract, risk of loss passes from the seller
to the buyer when the goods pass the ship's rail at the port of shipment).
98. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 280c, at 605; accord Smith Co. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107,
110 A. 94 (1920).
99. Smith v. Moscahlades, 193 A.D. 126, 183 N.Y.S. 500 (1920); Smith Co. v. Marano,
267 Pa. 107, 110 A. 94 (1920). See generally WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 280c, at 605.
100. Gen. Couns. Mem. 2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188 (1928).
101. In a case decided by the Board of Tax Appeals after the issuance of Gen. Couns.
Mem. 2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188 (1928), title passage concepts were not addressed by the parties or the
court. One might hypothesize that the case was already in the proverbial pipeline when the government changed its official view, and attempts were not made to reverse the positions taken on
brief.
In Porto Rico Consol. Fruit Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 778 (1929), the taxpayers were
U.S. corporations that-raised fruit and sugar cane in Puerto Rico for sale to customers in the
United States. Pursuant to § 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 271
(the predecessor LR.C. § 936, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 936)), U.S. corporations were
not taxed on income from foreign sources if they derived at least 80% of gross income from
sources within a U.S. possession and if at least 50% of gross income was derived from the active
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B. Stage Two. The Supreme Court Changes the Commissioner's
Mind (1929-1934)
Notwithstanding his unequivocal 1928 statement that income is
conduct of a trade or business within a U.S. possession.
The taxpayers argued that their entire income was derived from foreign sources since all of
their income was derived from the sale of farm products grown in Puerto Rico. The government
likewise focused on the location of the taxpayers' activities, as was its pre-Gen: Couns. Mem.
2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188 (1928) practice, but argued that these activities were predominantly in the
United States, an interesting position in light of the lack of importance placed upon the farming
operations themselves. Consistent with its own prior decisions, the Board focused on the nationality or location of the buyers, not on the location of the sellers; since the customers were U.S.
persons, the gains were entirely U.S. source. 16 B.T.A. at 780. See Brookfield Linen Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 168 (1929); Billwiller v. Commissioner, II B.T.A. 841 (1928); In re Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B.T.A. 1248 (1927); Birkin v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 402 (1926).
The Board's decision, although seemingly consistent with prior cases, is noteworthy for its
ignorance of the then prevailing statutes and regulations, which effectively overturned the decisions relied upon by the court and supported a decision in the taxpayers' favor. The Revenue Act
of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, contained no rules for determining source in connection with
§ 262. Sourcing rules applicable to the taxation of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations,
however, were provided in § 217. In the case of goods manufactured by the taxpayer within and
sold without the United States, or manufactured without and sold within the United States, gains
were treated as derived partly from sources within and partly from sources without the United
States. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(c), 42 Stat. 227, 244. The purpose of this rule was to
overturn prior law, exemplified in Birkin, 5 B.T.A. at 402, Billwiller, I1 B.T.A. at 841, and
Brookfield Linen, 15 B.T.A. at 168, under which gains were sourced entirely in the country of
sale, regardless of where the goods were manufactured. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 85, at 16.
Authority was delegated to the Treasury Secretary to prescribe regulations allocating and
apportioning items not specifically sourced by statute. These regulations provided a separate rule
for sourcing income derived from natural resources:
The income derived from the ownership or operation of any farm, mine, oil or gas well,
other natural deposit, or timber, located within the United States, and from the sale by the
.producer of the products thereof within or without the United States, shall ordinarily be
included in gross income from sources within the United States.
Treas. Reg. 62, art. 326 (1922). This rule treats farming income differently from manufacturing
income by placing primary (or sole) importance on the location of production, i.e., the farm. In
Porto Rico, one might have argued that the converse of the farm rule ought to apply, namely that
income derived from the ownership or operation of a farm located outside the United States ought
to be treated entirely as income from foreign sources. This argument apparently was not made or
considered.
Contemporary I.R.S. pronouncements indicate that today, the I.R.S. would, in fact, apply the
converse rule'and view the income as foreign source. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-1(b)(1) (as amended in
1958) (restating verbatim Treas. Reg. 62, art. 326 (1922); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-6 (as amended in
1975) (converse of principle stated in Treas. Reg. § 1.863-1 applies in determining income from
foreign sources). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,538 (Nov. 1, 1973) (advances and patronage
dividends paid by a domestic farmers' cooperative to nonresident alien members for crops grown
outside the United States are sourced outside the United States regardless of the location of title
passage); Rev. Rul. 71-198, 1971-1 C.B. 210 (income of a Puerto Rican corporation from the sale
of raw tuna fish caught in international waters to canners in the United States is from foreign
sources); Rev. Rul. 67-194, 1967-1 C.B. 183 (income of a foreign corporation from mining and
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sourced in accordance with passage of title,' 0 2 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue soon experienced a change of heart. What precipitated
this change was the Supreme Court decision in Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 0 3 in which
neither the Commissioner nor the Treasury Department played a role.
The Commissioner misconstrued Compania to justify abandoning his
prior acquiescence in the title passage rule.
In Compania, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands construing a section of the Philippine income tax statute. The statute, which was similar to corresponding provisions of United States revenue laws, taxed
"the total net income received in the preceding year from all sources
within the Philippine Islands by every corporation . . .organized . . .
under the laws of any foreign country." 10 '
The taxpayer, Compania, was a Spanish corporation engaged in
the Philippine Islands in buying, selling, and exporting sugar, oils, and
tobacco. From time to time, Compania exported its products to the
United States. The parties stipulated that the merchandise "was sold in
the United States" by Compania's U.S. agency, but also stipulated that
each sale was "subject to confirmation and absolute control as to price
and other terms and conditions thereof, by the plaintiff's Philippine
branch."0 5
The Court found the stipulation susceptible to two distinct interpretations, resulting in opposite tax consequences. First, the stipulation
could have meant that, as to each sale, confirmation was given by the
Philippine home office directly to the buyer, or was otherwise the final
act 6onsummating the sale. Under this interpretation, since the final
act would have occurred in the Philippines, the sale would have concluded there. Gains from such sales would have been derived from Philippine sources and, therefore, would have been subject to Philippine
income tax.' 0 6
On the other hand, the stipulation could have meant that the Philippine office was merely approving or ratifying negotiations already
completed by the U.S. agent, that is, sales consummated by the agent
processing
102.
103.
104.
Laws, P.I.
105.
106.

sylvinite in a foreign country and sale in the United States is from foreign sources).
Gen. Couns. Mem. 2,467, 7-2 C.B. 188, 195 (1928).
279 U.S. 306 (1929).
Id. at 307 (quoting Philippine Income Tax Law of March 7, 1919, Act 2833, 14 Pub.
221, as amended by Act 2926, March 20, 15 Pub. Laws, P.I. 260).
279 U.S. at 308.
Id. at 309.
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in the United States. Since the sales would have been concluded in the
and,
United States, gains would have been derived from U.S. sources107
tax.
income
Philippine
to
subject
been
have
not
therefore, would
In light of the ambiguous stipulation, the Court found that Compania had failed to prove that the lower court's findings in favor of the
tax collector were clearly erroneous. 10 8 The lower court's decision was
affirmed and the taxpayer's gains from export sales were sourced in the
Philippine Islands.
In 1930, within months after the Compania decision was handed
down, the Commissioner released General Counsel Memorandum
8,594,19 revoking his prior adoption of the title passage rule. Henceforth, the location where an agreement to sell is made would determine
the source of profits on the underlying sale. 110
The Commissioner explained that while the term "sale," in the
context of commercial law, refers to the transfer of property (that is,
title)"' from one person to another, this characterization does not present the essential, character of the transaction for purposes of determining source.' 12 For the latter purpose, the Commissioner mistakenly interpreted Compania as characterizing the essential nature of the
transaction as the agreement to sell, i.e., the contract itself." 8 Therefore, the source of income ought to follow the location where the agreement is made, without regard to the location of title passage.11 The
Commissioner incorrectly understood the Supreme Court to have rejected the title passage rule when the Court concluded that the time
and place of delivery were irrelevant to its holding."'
The Commissioner in General Counsel Memorandum 8,594 misread and, therefore, misapplied the Compania decision, which is entirely consistent with title passage principles. In commercial sales, a
contract to sell unascertained goods cannot transfer title to the buyer
107. Id. at 309.
108. Id. at 310.
109. Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594, 9-2 C.B. 354 (1930).
110. Id. at 359. All prior inconsistent pronouncements, including Gen. Couns. Mem. 2,467,
7-2 C.B. 188 (1928) were revoked. Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594, 9-2 C.B. 354 (1930).
111. See supra note 96.
112. Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594, 9-2 C.B. 354 (1930).
113. Id. at 358.
114. Id. at 358-59.
115. Id. at 358. See Compania, 279 U.S. at 309 ("If, in fact, the sales were thus made in
the Philippine Islands, we think it unimportant whether the merchandise sold was exported before
or after its sale.").
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until the goods are ascertained." 6 A contract at this point is, at most,
an executory contract to sell."1 7 If, however, the contract is for sale of
specific or ascertained goods, title is transferred to the buyer when the
parties to the contract intend it to be transferred." 8 Absent specific
contractual recitals to the contrary, title is presumed to pass to the
buyer when the contract is made; the time of delivery is irrelevant.1 19
The facts stipulated in Compania did not specify whether the
goods were ascertained when the contracts were entered into, nor did
they specify whether the contracts contained recitals that would negate
the presumptions of title passage. In addition, as noted by the Court,
the stipulated facts were ambiguous as to the location of consummation
of the contracts. 2 ' Thus, once the Court had concluded that the contracts of sale were finalized in the Philippines, basic principles of commercial law mandated a finding that title to the goods passed in the
Philippines if the goods were ascertained at the time that the contract
was finalized. Since for tax purposes the location of sale followed the
passing of title, gains from the sale were correctly sourced in the
Philippines.
This analysis is consistent with the opinion of the Board of Tax
Appeals in Briskey Co. v. Commissioner,'2 ' in which a U.S. corporation received and accepted orders from purchasers in the United States
and cabled them to its India branch. The India branch then purchased
the goods to fill the orders and.shipped the goods to the U.S. office for
forwarding to the purchasers. Since the goods were not in the possession of the taxpayer when it negotiated with purchasers in the United
States, i.e., the goods were not ascertained, the earliest time a sale
could have been consummated was when the goods were ascertained
through a purchase in India.' 2 ' Until the goods were purchased, an ac116. UNIF. SALES ACT § 17, 1 U.L.A. 309-10 (1950); accord Hettrick Mfg. Co. v. Srere,
235 Mich. 306, 209 N.W. 97 (1926); Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 P.
523 (1919); see generally WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 258, at 520.
117. UNIF. SALES ACT § I(1), 1 U.L.A. 2 (1950); see generally WILLISTON, supra note 77,

§2.
118. UNIF. SALES ACT § 18(1), 1 U.L.A. 311 .(1950); accord Rehrv. Trumbull Lumber
Co., 110 Ohio St. 208, 143 N.E. 558 (1924); Cassinelli Y. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208,
183 P. 523 (1919); see generally WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 261.
119. UNIF. SALES ACT § 19(1), 1 U.L.A. 323-24 (1950); accord Levinson v. Connors, 269
Mass. 209, 168 N.E. 736 (1929); Delaney v. Globe Shipbuilding Co., 175 Wis. 167, 184 N.W.
696 (1921); see generally WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 264.
120. Compania, 279 U.S. at 309.
121. 29 B.T.A. 987 (1934), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 1, aff'd, 78 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1935).
122. Briskey, 29 B.T.A. at 991.
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ceptance of an order by the home office created, at most, an executory
contract to sell. "The earliest moment that there could be a sale under

such circumstances was when the goods were acquired in India and
appropriated to the contract."1 3 Since the final acts consummating the
sales, appropriation of the goods to the contract, occurred in India, the
124
location of sale and the source of gains were foreign.
C. Stage Three: The Commissioner Decides That Maybe He Was
Right in the First Place (1934-1947)
Following the issuance of General Counsel Memorandum 8,594,

the Commissioner's litigating position was firmly grounded on his curious interpretation of Compania.12' The Board of Tax Appeals, how123. Id.
124. Id. Curiously, the Commissioner failed to apply its own Compania-inspired analysis in
1934, only four years after adopting it. In Gen. Couns. Mem. 13,475, 13-2 C.B. 224 (1934), a
Canadian corporation, which owned timber lands and produced pulpwood, contracted with a U.S.
corporation, which operated paper mills, for the sale of pulpwood to be delivered in the United
States. The contract was negotiated and drawn up in the United States and signed in this country
by the American buyer, but was signed by the Canadian seller in Canada.
Pursuant to § 119(e) of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 828, the income
attributable to production was sourced in Canada. At issue was the source of the income attributable to sale. Citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594, 9-2 C.B. 354 (1930), the taxpayer argued that
since the contract became final upon being signed in Canada, the income attributable to sales was
sourced outside the United States.
The Commissioner made the following heretical statement:
The physical operations, not the contract, are the substantial thing. That Congress in enacting the law was likewise looking to substance in the case of purchase and sale is a fair
assumption. The use in the taxing statute of the word "sold" with the word "produced,"
and "sale" with "purchase," shows contemplation of the ordinary commercial processes
whereby the manufacturer of goods sells them to the consumer or middleman, and the
middleman purchases and resells to the consumer or another middleman. The substance as
well as the purpose of such purchases and sales is passage of the property in the goods. In
the overwhelming majority of cases the goods pass into the physical possession of the purchaser, and the transaction is not regarded as complete until the purchaser controls the
goods.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 13,475, 13-2 C.B. 224 (1934). Campania was distinguished on the basis that
the Philippine home office in Campania had authority and control over the terms of the contract
while, in the transaction at issue, all negotiations as to price, terms, and conditions were settled in
the United States, where the contract was drafted; the signature was a "mere formality." The
portions of the taxpayer's profits' attributable to sales, thus, were sourced in the United States.
While the Commissioner did not go so far as to say that title passage principles applied, Gen.
Couns. Mem. 13,475, 13-2 C.B. 224, 225 (1934) clearly did not apply a strict final acts analysis.
125. See, e.g., East Coast Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 558 (1934), affd, 85 F.2d
322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936); Exolon Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 844
(1941), acq. and nonacq., 1942-1 C.B. 6 & 22, nonacq. withdrawn and acq., 1947-2 C.B. 2; see
also Ronrico Corp. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1130 (1941), nonacq. 1941-2 C.B. 22, nonacq.
withdrawn and acq., 1944-1 C.B. 24 (discarding significance of location of negotiations leading to,
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ever, consistently applied title passage principles and, in the ensuing
years of Stage Three, the Commissioner failed to win a single case on
Compania grounds. Ultimately, he capitulated.
In 1934, the same year the Commissioner issued General Counsel

Memorandum 8,594, both the Board and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decisively rejected the government's analysis of Compania, 126 finding that case completely consistent with the "established rule
that the place where title passes is the place of sale."' 7 Notably, the
case, East Coast Oil Co. v. Commissioner,2 8 was the first to refer to
the fact that title encompasses risks, which pass to the buyer when title
passes. 129 During the ensuing thirteen years, the Board consistently

held against the Commissioner where title passed outside the United
States, deeming irrelevant the location of the final act consummating
130
the contract.
Finally conceding defeat, the Commissioner agreed that in a sales
transaction, the place where title passes determines the source of income.1 31 However, capitulation was not total. Where a seller retains
bare legal title, e.g., for purposes of securing payment, the Commissioner deemed the sale to have occurred at the time and place of pasexsage to the buyer of the beneficial ownership and risk of loss. This
32
ception is consistent with basic principles of commercial law.1
and execution of, contract of sale).
126. East Coast Oil, 31 B.T.A. at 560-61, 85 F.2d at 323.
127. East Coast Oil, 31 B.T.A. at 561. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
Both the Board and the court of appeals also ascribed weight to the lengthy period during which
the government had adhered to the title passage rule prior to Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594, 9-2 C.B.
354 (1930). East Coast Oil, 31 B.T.A..at 560, aff'd, 85 F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir. 1936).
128. 31 B.T.A. 558 (1934), affid, 85 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936).
129. East Coast Oil, 31 B.T.A. at 561.
130. Hazleton Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 908 (1937), nonacq., 1938-1.C.B. 50; An37,353; Ronrico Corp. v. Commisglo-Mexican Petroleum Co., Ltd., 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H)
sioner, 44 B.T.A. 1130 (1941); Exolon Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 844 (1941). Even where
the Board's decision favored the Commissioner, title passage principles were applied. Ardbern Co.
v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 910 (1940), modified, 120 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1941) (title to stock
passed when share certificates were delivered in New York); Askania Werke v. Commissioner, 33
B.T.A. 875 (1936), rev'd, 96 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (title to goods passed in United States; on
appeal, decision reversed for evidentiary and procedural errors).
131. Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,131, 1947-2 C.B.'85 (1947). "No doubt there were in the seventeen year interval, 1930 [Gen. Couns. Mem. 8,594] to 1947 [Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,131], many
taxpayers who paid United States income tax on income not properly ascribable to United States
sources. It seems that the only ones to escape that fate were those hardy taxpayers who litigated
the question." Baker & Meek, Tax Problems of Doing Business Abroad: Some Practical Considerations, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 75, 92 n.52.
132. Baker & Meek, supra note 131, at 92 n.52. See WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 280c;
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The Commissioner added the following warning:
[I]n any case in which the sales transaction is arranged in a particular manner
for the primary purpose of tax avoidance, the foregoing rules will not be applied.
In such cases, all factors of the transaction, such as negotiations, the execution of
the agreement, the location of the property, and the place of payment, will be
considered, and the sale will be treated as having been consummated at the place
where the substance of the sale occurred. 1 58

The position stated in General Counsel Memorandum 25,131 was eventually incorporated into regulations, and remains applicable today.""
Although the government ultimately acquiesced to title passage con-

cepts, it was not willing to tolerate abuse by sophisticated tax planners.
If transactions were designed primarily for avoiding tax, the government would not respect the location of title passage. Nevertheless, the
parameters of the Commissioner's admonition were vague.
135
D. Stage Four: The Commissioner Tries Again (1955-1974)

With the title passage rule firmly in place, the courts finally began
to contemplate the meaning of the rule in Stage Four. The backdrop
accord Ronrico, 44 B.T.A. at 1135-36; Briskey Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 987, 991 (1934).
133. The government's tax avoidance concerns were based on Kaspare Cohn Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 646 (1936), appeal dismissed, 109 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1940), in which the
stockholders of a closely held U.S. corporation attempted to avoid tax on gains from the sale by
the U.S. corporation of certain public utility stocks. A foreign corporation was formed, to which
the public utility stocks were transferred in a nontaxable exchange. The foreign corporation then
sold the utility stocks to a U.S. purchaser, with delivery (and passage of title) outside the United
States. Since the foreign corporation was taxable only on its U.S. source income, Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, §§ 217, 233(b), 44 Stat. 9, 30, 41, the gains, which were foreign source, would not
be taxable. If the foreign corporation had distributed any of its gain, the U.S. corporate stockholder might have been taxed on the distribution. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 213(a),
233(a), 44 Stat. 9, 23, 41.
The Board never discussed the source of the gains; it found that the foreign corporation was
an agent of the U.S. corporation, a mere conduit for passing title to the utility stocks, and disregarded the separateness of the two corporations. Kaspare Cohn, 35 B.T.A. at 668.
The facts in Hazleton, 36 B.T.A. at 908, were substantially similar to those in Kaspare Cohn.
The Commissioner, however, did not make the tax avoidance arguments that he had pursued in
Kaspare Cohn, and the case was heard only on the issue of where the sale took place. Since the
documents clearly established the parties' intent to pass title abroad, the (newly incorporated)

foreign corporation's gains were foreign source and, therefore, not subject to U.S. income tax.
Hazleton, 36 B.T.A. at 924.
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957).
135. Nothing of significance, with respect to the title passage rule, occurred between 1947,
the end of Stage Three, and'1955, the beginning of Stage Four. But cf. Estate of Cadwallader v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 214 (1949); G.A. Stafford & Co. v. Pedrick, 78 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), afl-d, 171 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1948) (title passage rule applied).
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for a new set of government challenges was provided by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Balanovski.136 In
Balanovski, an Argentine partnership with minimal contacts in the
United States purchased trucks and equipment from U.S. suppliers for

resale to an agency of the Argentine Government, on an F.O.B. (free
on board) New York City basis.' 3 7 The government argued that the
title passage rule dictated a finding that gains were sourced in the
38
United States.1

Despite. the overwhelming precedent that had evolved in Stages
One, Two, and Three, the District Court refused to apply the title passage rule. In the court's view, sourcing the gains in the United States
would have been unreasonable, -particularly where passage of title in
New York City had been arranged-at the insistence of the purchaser. 13 9
The court justified its brushing aside of precedent on the grounds that

the negotiations were carried out in Argentina, the buyer was an
agency of the Argentine government, and the ultimate destination of
the goods was Argentina. Not surprisingly, the decision was reversed
on appeal in light of the "universally adopted"' 4 0 title passage rule.' 4 '

The Second Circuit Court- of Appeals, however, made the following gratuitous statement, which drew the attention of the Commissioner: "Of course, this test may present problems, as where passage of
title is formally delayed to avoid taxes. Hence it is not necessary, nor is
it desirable, to require rigid adherence to this test under all circumstances."' 4 2 Coupled with the Commissioner's previous warning that
the title passage rule would 'not apply where a transaction was ar136. 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
137. In an F.O.B. contract, the seller is bound to put the goods on board a vessel or carrier
free of expense to the buyer. See WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 280a, at 597. Expressions F.O.B.
the point of destination are less common, and require the seller to deliver the goods, free of expense to the buyer, to the point named. Id. at 601. Title in the goods passes to the buyer at the
designated point of delivery. Id. § 280b, at 602. Cf.INCOTERMS 1990, supra note 77, at 38-39 (in
an F.O.B. contract, seller must"'bear all risks of loss of or damage to the goods until such time as
they have passed the ship's rail at the named port of shipment" and buyer must -[b]ear all risks
of loss of or damage to the goods from the time they have passed the ship's rail at the named port
of shipment").
138. United States v. Balanovski, 131 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
139. Id. at 902-03.
140. Balanovski, 236 F.2d at 305 n.4.
141. Id. at 304-05. The court of appeals also noted that the risk of loss
passed before the
ocean voyage and that it was the buyer, not the seller, who purchased marine insurance. Id. at
306. See infra text accompanying notes 154-59.
142. Balanovski, 236 F.2d at 306.
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ranged primarily to avoid tax,'"3 the court's dicta inspired the Commissioner to explore the limits of title passage and the breadth of its tax
avoidance exception.
The vehicle for the Commissioner's expedition was the Western

Hemisphere Trade Corporation (WHTC), a legislatively created entity
entitled to preferential tax treatment." ' To qualify for favorable status,
a domestic corporation was required to: (1) conduct all of its business
in the Western Hemisphere, (2) derive ninety-five percent of its gross
income from sources outside the United States, and (3) derive ninety
percent or more of its gross income from the active conduct of a trade
or business." 5 In a typical scenario,14 a U.S. exporter would organize
a domestic subsidiary whose sole purpose was to purchase goods manu-

factured by the parent and then resell the goods to purchasers in the
Western Hemisphere. 4 7 To ensure that all of the subsidiary's income
was from foreign sources, sales documents would explicitly state that
title to the goods passed from the seller to the buyer outside the United
States.

The Commissioner apparently believed that WHTC benefits required more than a series of paper transactions, 4 and launched a full
scale attack on corporations claiming WHTC benefits. The government
143. Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,131, 1947-2 C.B. 85, 86; Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957). See
supra text accompanying note 134.
144. Created by the. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 141, 56 Stat. 798, 838, the WHTC
was exempt from tht corporate surtax until the exemption was eliminated by the Revenue Act of
1950, ch. 989, § 122(c), 64 Stat. 906, 920, which substituted a credit against the normal tax. See
I.R.C. of 1939 § 109. Most recently, WHTCs were entitled to a deduction. See I.R.C. of 1954
§ 921. The WHTC provisions were repealed for taxable years beginning after December 31,
1979. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1052(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1647-48.
145. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 141, 56 Stat. 798, 838.
146. E.g., Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365 (1960), acq., 1961-2
C.B. 4, acq., 1964-2 C.B. 4.
147. The parent never could meet the 95% foreign income requirement, since a portion
(generally, 50%) of its income would be allocable to manufacturing, and would be sourced in the
United States. See I.R.C. § 863 (West Supp. 1990) and its predecessors.
148. In Pan Am. Eutectic Welding Alloys Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 284 (1961), the
Commissioner argued that "within the intendment of the statute the petitioner would have to be
present and conducting some business within the foreign countries of the Western Hemisphere to
establish that the source of its sales income was without the United States." Id. at 290-91. Cf.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,464 (Mar. 25, 1971) (where a foreign subsidiary acts as the export arm of
a domestic parent corporation, "[tihis office has taken the position that where there is no significant economic penetration into the foreign market areas by the export subsidiary, the significant
acts in making and completing the sales have occurred in the United States, and no business
purpose can be shown in passing title outside the United States, the substance of the sale test
[rather than the title passage rule] can be applied").
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typically argued that, since passage of title was delayed solely or primarily for the purpose of avoiding tax, the location at which the seller's
obligations with respect to the sale were performed, and not the situs of
title passage, ought to determine source. 1 9 The government also argued

that retention of title until the goods arrived at a foreign point had no
substance, since recitals delaying title passage did not prevent beneficial ownership from passing in the United States even though title
technically remained with the seller. 5 '
The government lost every case.' For example, in Barber-Greene
Americas v. Commissioner,152 the court reasonably viewed the tax-inspired arrangements as within the contemplation of Congress, since the
WHTC was created specifically to provide tax benefits to U.S. corporations engaged in foreign trade.1" 3 As to the government's second argu-

ment, the court correctly concluded that both beneficial ownership and
legal title passed at the foreign port, reasoning that, in retaining ownership, the seller undertook real responsibilities, risks, and obligations

that would not have been assumed had title passed in the United,
States. 54
The petitioners assumed the risk of delays in transit or loss or damage en route,
the responsibility of engaging freight forwarders and of arranging many other
details. They could and did protect themselves to some extent by insurance
against losses in transit, but if the insurer would not or could not pay, the loss
would be that of the petitioners..It is their right to elect whether to avoid these
149. See, e.g., Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365, 384-85 (1960).
150. See, e.g., id. at 385.
151. Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1964), aff g,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 506 (1963); Commissioner v. Hammond Organ W. Export Corp., 327 F.2d
964 (7th Cir. 1964), aff'g, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1963); Frank v. International Canadian Corp.,
308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9405 (W.D. Wash. 1961);
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9269 (N.D. Ill.
1967); A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Babson Bros. Export
Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 677 (1963); Pan Am. Eutectic, 36 T.C. at 284; BarberGreene, 35 T.C. at 365. But see American Food Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 14 (1957)
(terms of sales by a WHTC caused title to pass in the United States and the Commissioner
successfully argued that title passage principles applied). Cf. Philipp Bros. Intercontinent Corp. v.
United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9421 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (in connection with excess
profits tax, court applied substance of sale test, not title passage rule, and found that gains were
sourced in United States; in most sales, title passed in United States).
152. 35 T.C. 365 (1960).
153. Barber-Greene, 35 T.C. at 386.
154. This conclusion is consistent with commercial law, which provided that title passed
when the parties intended, UNIF. SALES ACT § 18(1), 1 U.L.A. § 11 (1950), and in ascertaining
those intentions, regard was given to the terms of the contract and usages of trade, UNIF. SALES
ACT § 18(2), 1 U.L.A. 311 (1950). See generally WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 261.

TITLE PASSAGE RULE

1991]

risks or to undertake these risks and qualify for the tax benefits offered by
Congress.' "

Other motives for delaying title passage might include control over
goods while in transit,"" rights and remedies in the event the.purchaser
fails to pay or becomes insolvent, 157 and protection against losses
caused by a trade embargo, seizure or nationalization by a foreign government, or strike. 1 " In addition, retaining title permits the shipper to
insure goods with a United States insurance carrier, enabling it to recover directly in U.S. currency.'"
In light of his mounting losses, 160 the Commissioner agreed to apply the title passage rule to WHTCs, even where foreign presence was

minimal or nonexistent.' 6'
E.

Stage Five: The Modern Era (1981-1990)162

The axiom, "better late than never," is exemplified in the most
recent title passage cases, in which the Tax Court finally incorporated
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") into its analyses of title
155. Barber-Greene, 35 T.C. at 387-88. Accord Pfaudler, 330 F.2d at 475; Hammond Organ, 327 F.2d at 966; Babson Bros., 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 686; Pan Am. Eutectic, 36 T.C. at 291.

The Court of Claims has indicated that retention of title until delivery must serve a business
purpose apart from the expected tax consequences, A.P. Green, 284 F.2d at 390, but other courts
have not discussed business purpose. But see Pfaudler, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 511 (without discussion, court rejected I.R.S. argument that retention of title served no business purpose). Notably,
A.P. Green is the first opinion in the area citing the Uniform Commercial Code, albeit without
discussion. 284 F.2d at 388.
156.

Hammond Organ, 327 F.2d at 966.

157.

Id.

158. A.P. Green, 284 F.2d at 390.
159. Id. See also Baker & Meek, supra note 131, at 80-83; Baker & Hightower, The Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation: A Problem in the Law of Sales, 22 TUL. L. REV. 229, 251-53

(1947). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 221-25 (discussion of risks retained by seller where
passage of title or risk of loss is delayed).
160. The government had lost in three circuit courts of appeal, the Court of Claims, and the
Tax Court. Perhaps the Commissioner hoped to obtain contradictory decisions at the circuit court
level, enabling him to bring the issue to the Supreme Court for resolution. Cf. Hammond Organ,
327 F.2d at 966 ("In effect, the Commissioner is seeking from this Court, a holding which would
be in conflict with the decision of every court which has considered the issues here presented.").
161. Rev. Rul. 64-198, 1964-2 C.B. 189; accord Rev. Rul. 74-249, 1974-1 C.B. 189. I.R.S.
internal memoranda indicate that the agency would have continued to argue against applying the
title passage rule to a foreign subsidiary acting as the export arm of its U.S. parent unless the
subsidiary maintained a substantial U.S. presence. Gen Couns. Mem. 34,464 (Mar. 25, 1971);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,666 (Oct. 26, 1967).
162. Nothing of significance, with respect to the title passage rule, occurred between 1974,
the end of Stage Four, and 1981, the beginning of Stage Five.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:521

passage and source. Drafting of the U.C.C. formally began in 1942,6 a
and Pennsylvania, the first state to adopt the U.C.C., did so in 1953.""
Yet, the difficulties that inspired changes in commercial law and
culminated in widespread adoption of the U.C.C., including article 2
(sale of goods), were never referred to in relevant tax decisions until
1981.165 The Tax Court has yet to reach a full understanding of the
principles underlying article 2, in particular its repudiation of the title
concept, and, therefore, has been unable effectively to incorporate the
U.C.C. into its analyses of source.
Prior to the U.C.C., the location of title to goods as between seller
and buyer determined a variety of legal consequences, such as risk of
loss, a seller's right to the purchase price, a buyer's right to the goods,
and rights of third parties (e.g., creditors or trustees in bankruptcy). 166
The location of title also had consequences outside the commercial
realm, such as the sourcing of income in international sales of personal
property. Thus, the "great game in sales" was to find the location of
title; "[w]hen title passed, title passed, and we could all go home,
1 7
whatever the specific issue.'
Although title passage depended upon the intentions of the par1
6
ties, 8 lay persons generally did not think in terms of title and, therefore, frequently failed to state expressly their intentions regarding title
passage.' 6 9 Legal presumptions intended to fill these gaps generated lit70
igation with confusing and often inconsistent results.1
163. General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute, I U.L.A. xv, xvi (1989).
164. 1953 Pa. Laws 3, No. I (repealed 1979).
165. See Miami Purchasing Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 818 (1981). But cf.
A.P. Green, 284 F.2d at 388 (U.C.C. cited without discussion).
166. See generally Whiteside, supra note 96, at 173; Note, A Comparison of the Rights
and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform
Sales Act, 49 Ky. L.J. 270 (1960).
167. Whiteside, supra note 96, at 173; accord Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a
Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. 159, 169 (1938).
168. UNIF. SALES ACT § 18, 1 U.L.A. 311 (1950).
169. Whiteside, supra note 96, at 174; cf. I STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 28-29 (1954) (statement of Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, chief reporter of the Uniform
Commercial Code). Id. at 152 (statement of James M. Snee); cf. Miami Purchasing, 76 T.C. at
827 ("The individual who served as president of both petitioning corporations testified that he
knew that the term [FOB.] meant 'free on board,' that he understood the term to indicate only
the price of the goods at the indicated location, and that he had never heard of the Uniform
Commercial Code in all of the time that he had been in the exporting business.").
170. Whiteside, supra note 96, at 174. "The purpose [of Article, 21 is to avoid making
practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the
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The U.C.C. replaced the title approach by considering the various
factual situations in which rights and responsibilities arose, and prescribing specific legal consequences with respect to each.17 1 For example, the U.C.C. includes provisions regarding risk of loss, 1 72 a seller's
right of action for the price,17 and a buyer's right to obtain the
goods.174 Title is largely irrelevant.' 5 The U.C.C.'s catch-all title rule,
which restates pre-U.C.C. principles, applies only to factual situations
that were not envisioned by the drafters. 6
The Tax Court first attempted to incorporate U.C.C. principles in
Miami PurchasingService Corp. v. Commissioner,7 7 in which the Internal Revenue Service challenged the qualification of two domestic
corporations for WHTC benefits. " 8 Although the taxpayers claimed
that they had intended to pass title to goods outside the United States,
the Court found that the terms of sales documents (such as invoices
and insurance policies) provided for title passage within the United
79

States.'

The court's analysis was traditional: the terms of the agreement
passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of
words and actions of a tangible character." U.C.C. § 2-101 official comment (1987). See also
Llewellyn, supra note 167, at 167-68. But see Williston,. supra note 96, at 566-69.
171. Whiteside, supra note 96, at 172-74. See also U.C,.C. § 2-101 official comment
(1987). A similar approach is followed in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, arts. 66-70, U.N. Doc. A/CON F.97/18/Annex I (1980), reprinted
in 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6274 (1987), which went into effect on January 1, 1988. Honnold, The New
Uniform Law for InternationalSales and the UCC: A Comparison, 18 INT'L LAW. 21, 27 (1984);
Mendes, The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada Transactions:Enticing the World's Largest
Trading Bloc to do Business Under a Global Sales Law, 8 J.L. & COM. 109, 136 (1988). According to one commentator, "[wihat American lawyers learned from the UCC made a profound
contribution to international sales law." Honnold, supra, at 27. Unlike the U.C.C., however, the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is concerned only with the rights and
obligations of the seller and buyer. arising from a sales contract, and not with claims of third
parties. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 4, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/18/Annex 1 (1980), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264 (1987).
172. U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (1987).
173. U.C.C. § 2-709 (1987).
174. U.C.C. §§ 2-502, 2-716 (1987).
175. See U.C.C. § 2-509 official comment 1 (1987); U.C.C. § 2-709 official comment 1
(1987).
176. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1987). The section also is meant to apply where a public regulation
depends upon the location of title as defined in private law. Id. official comment 1.Cf Llewellyn,
supra note 167, at 170-71.
177. 76 T.C. 818 (1981).
178. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. The taxable 'years in issue predated
repeal of the WHTC legislation.
179. Miami Purchasing, 76 T.C. at 827-29.
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were analyzed to determine where the parties intended to pass title.
The U.C.C. was cited, but only with respect to definitions of the terms
"C.I.F." and "F.O.B."'' I The U.C.C.'s catch-all title rule was never
mentioned. Although the court occasionally referred to risk of loss, the
U.C.C.'s risk of loss rules were never mentioned. The court's conclusion, that title passed in the United States, was correct, but theopinion
failed to incorporate either the statutory provisions of the U.C.C. or its
underlying philosophy.
In Kates Holding Co. v. Commissioner,8 1 the court fashioned a
solution that effectively rewrote the Commissioner's regulation. The
regulation (which restates the position set forth in General Counsel
Memorandum 25,131)182 provides in relevant part:
[A] sale of personal property is consummated at the time when, and the place
where, the rights, title, and interest of the seller in the property are transferred
to the buyer. Where bare legal title is retained by the seller, the sale shall be
deemed to have occurred at the time and place of passage to the buyer of beneficial ownership and the risk of loss. 18

Both the regulation and the General Counsel Memorandum merely restated pre-U.C.C. commercial law-that title, including the sum of
rights and responsibilities attendant to ownership, passed from the
seller to the purchaser notwithstanding that the seller nominally retained title for the limited purpose of securing payment. 84
The Kates court, however, construed the regulation as always requiring an examination of the passage of beneficial ownership and risk
of loss, since the notion of title could never refer to more than "bare
legal title" under modern commercial laws. 185 The court's interpretation is without precedential support, and can be explained only by the
court's recognition of the diminishing importance of the title concept
and confusion as to how to incorporate the newer concepts in the
U.C.C. Reinterpreting the regulation makes its future applicability uncertain: if the location of title passage is irrelevant, then why pay it lip
180. Id. at 828 (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-319 and 2-320).
181.

79 T.C. 700 (1982).

182. Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,131, 1947-2 C.B. 85.
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957).
184. See supra note 77. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1987) ("title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title
is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a
security interest by the bill of lading").
185. Kates, 79 T.C. at 707.
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service at all? Should the regulation be rewritten to reflect modern
commercial law and its focus on risk of loss?
The most interesting case decided in this era is also the most recent. In Liggett Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,'86 the government's arguments bore an eerie resemblance to its pre-title passage rule positions. The taxpayer, Paddington, a domestic corporation, was the
exclusive distributor in the United States of J&B Rare Scotch Whiskey, which Paddington purchased from the manufacturer, J&B. In a
typical transaction, 187 Paddington received an order to purchase a specified quantity of J&B Rare from a customer in the United States,
whereupon Paddington issued its own purchase order to J&B, reflecting
essentially the same information as set forth in the customer's order.
J&B then delivered the goods on board a carrier in Scotland and forwarded the appropriate documentation (including a bill of lading to the
order of Paddington) to Paddington, who endorsed the bill to its customer and transmitted the documents to either the customer or the customer's customs broker. Paddington took no responsibility for clearing
the goods through United States Customs and did not store the goods
at its own warehouse.
Paddington's written purchase orders to J&B contained no language concerning freight charges, insurance, risk of loss or passage of
title in the ordered goods. The term "F.O.B." did not appear in any of
the sales documents. The parties understood, however, that when the
goods passed over the ship's rails, they became the property of Paddington.' Similarly, customers' written purchase orders to Paddington
contained no language concerning freight charges, insurance, risk of
loss, or passage of title in the ordered goods. The parties understood,
however, that ownership and risk of loss passed from Paddington to the
customer when J&B loaded the goods aboard the ship in Scotland; in
fact, the customers insured the goods in transit. 189 Paddington, thus,
simultaneously acquired and dispo6ed of the risk of loss and, in the
court's view, Paddington's transitory ownership was sufficient to create
a sale, for purposes of the source rules. 9"
The court made no issue of risk of loss, but focused instead on
186. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1167 (1990).187. Paddington also sold small quantities of J&B Rare F.O.B. its own U.S. warehouse.
The taxpayer did not dispute that these sales were made in the United States. Id. at 1167-70.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1173.
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passage of title, ultimately holding that title passed from Paddington to
its customers when the goods were delivered on board the carriers in
Scotland.1 " ' The court's protracted analysis demonstrates the absurdity
of relying upon the concept of title in a U.C.C. milieu. Since title customarily passes concurrently with risk of loss, 9 ' it ought to be an exceptional case that requires a discrete examination of both. If in fact
both aspects of ownership do not pass at the same time, only risk of loss
has real consequences to the parties. As in both of the preceding cases,
citations to U.C.C. risk of loss rules are noticeably absent; only the
catch-all title passage rule, which has no substantive relevance in com93
mercial law, is cited.1
The government's interest in the case was apparently prompted by
Paddington's lack of activity outside the United States. For example,
the government argued that gains could not be sourced outside the
United States when Paddington performed no acts in connection with
the contract outside the United States. 94 The government also argued
that title could not pass until there was a contract for sale, and that a
contract had been concluded by Paddington's endorsement and transmittal of the documents in the United States. "5 The government further argued that there could have been no contract for sale until Paddington received the shipping documents from J&B in the United
States. 96 These arguments ignore the consistent holdings in the
WHTC cases, where the courts did not require taxpayers to engage in
foreign activities as a prerequisite for sourcing gains outside the United
States.' 97 Has the government tortuously come "full circle" and returned to its "final acts" or "substance of the sale" analysis? 9 8
191.

Id. at 1174-75.

192.

See, e.g., Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365, 387 (1960).

193. See, e.g., Liggett Group, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1172. A troubling aspect of the case,
and a possible explanation for the government's pursuance of it, is the fact that, despite the court's
conclusion that title vested in Paddington momentarily, risk of loss never was assumed by Paddington. But, Paddington took other risks, most notably the risk of payment by its customers;
Paddington was obliged to pay J&B for goods regardless of whether Paddington ultimately was
paid by its customers. Id. at 1171.
194.

Id. at 1176-77.

195.

Id. at 1176.

196.

Id. at 1177.

197.

See cases cited supra note 151.

198.

See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
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PASSAGE OF RISK OF Loss SHOULD DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF
GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

When the title concept was originally adopted by the Board of Tax
Appeals to analyze the source of gains from international sales of'personal property, title was everything-a single concept that incorporated
all of the rights, risks, and responsibilities associated with ownership. 199
Tax courts never were called upon to determine precisely which attributes of ownership were most important, so that the location at which
these attributes passed could determine the location of the sale and
thereby characterize the source of gains.
By way of contrast, legal scholars in the area of commercial sales
realized long ago that unifying all aspects of ownership under one concept was unworkable."' Thus, the U.C.C. appropriately abandoned the
single concept of title in favor of distinct rules that were intended to
achieve fair results in various factual situations. The U.C.C. allocated
risks, responsibilities, and benefits, in varying ways depending upon the
context in which the rules operated. 0 1 Curiously, tax courts have stubbornly adhered to the title concept and, thus, are thirty to forty years
behind the times.
The tax courts' initial and continuing attraction to the commercial
law concept of title may be explained by a lack of rigidly developed
principles within the tax area governing determinations of source.
Without any internal guidance, the tax courts have looked to the commercial law of sales and adopted its solution to an analogous set of
problems. 20 2 In light of the title concept's lack of purpose in the modern commercial realm, however, .it makes no sense for tax rulings to
follow title unless an independent rationale can be offered. Attempts by
the tax courts to explain the centrality of title have focused only on the
attribute of risk of loss. Notably, risk of loss passes along with, or perhaps as part of, title.20 ' Thus, it is both logical and fitting that in determining the source of profits from international sales of personal prop199. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 167.
201. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text. See also United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, arts. 66-70, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18/Annex
I (1980), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6274 (1987) (allocation of risk of loss between buyer
and seller).
202. See Alexander, supra note 91, at 133.
203. See, e.g., Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365, 387-88 (1960).
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erty, the term "title" be understood as connoting risk of loss rather
than mere legal title, a connotation with substantive significance.
In 1984, the Treasury Department advocated repealing the title
passage rule.20 ' However, it misunderstood the true nature of the title
passage rule qua risk of loss passage rule, and, therefore, mistakenly
concluded that the title passage rule ought to be repealed. To support
its position, the Treasury Department articulated a set of tax policy
principles that it believed ought to apply in formulating rules for determining the source of income. 20 These principles reflect an attempt to
define a nexus between the United States and income to be taxed, 20 6
and are not themselves controversial. When the Treasury Department
applied its tax policy principles to the title passage rule, however, it not
surprisingly found the title passage rule deficient.20 7 The Treasury Department's conclusions with respect to the title passage rule are questionable. The shortfall may be explained by the Treasury Department's
failure to understand the pivotal role played by risk of loss in the context of title passage.
A.

A Risk of Loss Rule Does Not Permit Artificial Manipulation of
Source of Income

The first principle stated by the Treasury Department is that a
source of income rule "should not allow erosion of the legitimate U.S.
tax base through taxpayer manipulation of the source rules or of the
foreign tax credit limitation."20 With respect to the title passage rule,
the Treasury Department argued that artificial manipulation of the location of title passage erodes both the U.S. tax base and the foreign tax
credit limitation.20 9 The Treasury Department believed that shifting
the site of title passage is arbitrary and nonsubstantive, and that any
resulting reduction in U.S. tax liability is unwarranted."'
204. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 364-68; TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 399-405.
205. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 365; accord TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 399.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
207. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 365; see also TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 399-400.
208. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 365; accord TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 399; see also
Garbarino, supra note 21, at 397.
Where title to goods sold by a U.S. exporter passes outside the United States, gains are
treated as foreign source income. See 1.R.C. § 862(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990). These foreign
source gains increase the numerator in the foreign tax credit limitation fraction, ultimately increasing the amount of the allowable foreign tax credit. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
209. TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 365; accord TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 399.
210. TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 365; accord TREASURY II, supra note 6, at 399.
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Parties to a sale may contractually determine where title,21 or risk
of loss,21 2 passes. While a rule allowing for manipulation of tax consequences without attendant economic or commercial significance clearly
is questionable as a matter of tax policy, the title passage rule, when
understood as a risk of loss passage rule, provides no such opportunities
for manipulation. Any transfer of the risk of loss effects a real benefit
to the party that is relieved of the risk and a real burden to the recipient.21 The location at which risk of loss passes is negotiated by the
parties, but, if an exporter departs from custom and passes title
abroad,214 it has undertaken additional responsibility with respect to
those goods.

In a typical C.I.F. or F.O.B. contract, title and risk of loss pass to
the buyer when the goods are delivered to a carrier.2 15 The seller of the
goods is freed from any hazards encountered after delivery. This is particularly beneficial to the seller where the carrier will be outside of the

seller's home country throughout most of its journey. By passing risk of
loss before shipment, the seller has relieved itself of risks occurring on
foreign territory.2 16 If, however, passage of title and risk of loss are
delayed, the seller takes on the burden of additional risks. For example,
the goods may be lost or damaged during shipment. 7 There may be
delays in transit, which could cause damage to perishable goods or up211. See U.C.C. § 2-401 (1987) (except as otherwise provided in the U.C.C., "title to
goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed
upon by the parties"); accord A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 387 (Ct. Cl.
1960). For examples of contractual recitals regarding passage of title, see R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-LEGAL FORMS §§ 1121-26 (1974 & Supp. 1989); F.
HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND PROCEDURES

UNDER

THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

22.07 (1990).
212. See U.C.C. § 2-509 (1987) (U.C.C. provisions allocating risk of loss "are subject to
contrary agreement of the parties"). For examples of contractual recitals regarding risk of loss,
see R. ANDERSON, supra note 211, §§ 1251-53; F.HART & W. WILLIER, supra note 211, 22.07.
213. See Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365, 387-88 (1960).
214. Traditionally, F.O.B., C.I.F., and C. & F. are the most favored trade terms. Ramberg,
Incoterms 1980 in N. HORN & C. SCHMITTHOFF, THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 137, 139 (1982), In sales utilizing any of these three trade terms,
title passes to the purchaser upon delivery of the goods to the carrier. See supra notes 77 (C.I.F.
and C. & F.) and 137 (F.O.B.).
215. See supra notes 77 (C.1.F. contracts) and 137 (F.O.B. contracts).
216. C. SCHMITTHOFF, EXPORT TRADE 22 (1990); Ramberg, supra note 214, at 139; accord
Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 365, 475 (2d Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Hammond Organ W. Export Corp., 327 F.2d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 1964); Barber-Greene
Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 365, 387-88 (1960).
217. D. SASSOON, C.I.F. AND F.O.B. CONTRACTS 4 (3d ed. 1975).
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set arrangements for local delivery or resale.218 In addition, there are
political risks; the business of a foreign purchaser may be subject to
expropriation or confiscation by a governmental authority.219
One might argue that in modern day sales, risk of loss is limited
by readily available insurance, and that the buyer ultimately bears the

cost of insurance, either by purchasing coverage directly or by paying a
price that reflects the cost of insurance purchased by the seller.220
These arguments fail to take into account potential defenses on the part
of insurance 'carriers, which could reduce proceeds or nullify coverage
altogether. 22 ' For example, the loss event may be excluded from the
policy, 222 the amount of insurance coverage may be inadequate, 223 or
1
the seller may inadvertently fail to satisfy the terms of the policy.224
In
addition, if the party who was expected to obtain coverage fails to do
so, then the party who bears the risk of loss indeed bears a very real
economic risk. Insurance, then, does not provide full and complete protection in all circumstances.
One might also argue that the title passage rule, even when understood as a risk of loss passage rule, permits taxpayers to determine tax
consequences contractually by arbitrarily agreeing upon the location of
passage of risk of loss. In this event, a transaction could be structured
218. C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 108.
219. S. EZER, INTERNATIONAL EXPORTING AGREEMENTS 1 9.02[2] (1989); accord A.P.
Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 393, 390 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-10018 (Nov. 25, 1981). See also Ramberg, supra note 214, at 140 (seller may choose to retain the
risk of loss throughout shipment because ability to control goods contributes to likelihood that
goods will arrive in good condition); accord Hammond Organ, 327 F.2d at 966.
220. Where the seller is required by the terms of the contract to obtain the insurance, e.g.,
in a C.I.F. contract, see supra note 98 and accompanying text, the policy must cover against risks
that are customary or usual in the particular trade, with respect to the cargo and voyage in question. C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 38; BENJAMIN'S SALE OF GOODS 6147 (A. Guest ed.,
3d ed. 1987); D. SASSOON, supra note 217,
183.
221. See Barber-Greene, 35 T.C. at 387-88:'
222. It is not unusual for policies to exclude from coverage loss or damage resulting from,
e.g., war, strikes or labor disturbances, or terrorists acts. C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 51920;'D. SASSOON, supra note 217, T1 125-134. An exclusion for loss or damage due to ordinary
leakage also is common. C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 517. See also BENJAMIN'S SALE OF
GOODS, supra note 220, 1653 (loss or damage due to transhipment and deviation).
223. In the absence of a clear custom of trade to the contrary, the seller is required to
insure only the reasonable value of the goods at the place of shipment. Although this value normally would include the cost of the goods as well as freight and insurance, it would not include
any anticipated rise in the value of the goods or profits expected by the buyer upon resale. C.
SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 38-39; BENJAMIN'S SALE OF GOODS, supra note 220,
1655; D.
SASSOON, supra note 217, 1 194.
224. It is not unusual for coverage to exclude loss or damage caused by insufficient packing
of the goods. C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 216, at 518.
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to afford desired tax consequences, rather than having the tax consequences flow from the structure of the transaction. Surely, it is preferable from a tax policy perspective that the latter be the norm. It would
be naive, however, to ignore the role played by tax considerations in
planning business transactions, including transactions with admittedly
economic substance.
The ability to locate risk of loss passage contractually should not
overshadow the fact that a party who benefits, taxwise, from locating
passage of title and risk of loss in a particular location also undertakes
risks, which could outweigh both the certainty of tax benefits and the
tax dollars saved. 22 5 In light of the additional risks and uncertainties
that are assumed, it is simplistic in the extreme to regard tax considerations as either the sole or principal driving force in negotiating the
terms of international sales. Recognizing the importance of risks of
ownership, by acknowledging risk of loss passage as determinative of
source, simply reflects a recognition of reality in international sales
transactions.
B.

A Risk of Loss Passage Rule Reflects the Economic Activity Generating the Income

The second principle stated by the Treasury Department is that a
source of income rule "should allocate income to the place where the
economic activity generating that' income occurs. 2 2 6 The Treasury Department argued that the title passage rule bears no relationship to the
place where the economic activity generating the income occurs. 27
The general approach advocated by the Treasury Department in
1984, and ultimately adopted by Congress in 1986 only as to sales of
personal property other than inventory, was to source gains at the location of the seller's residence.2 28 An exception applies if the predominant
portion of the selling activity is conducted by the seller through a fixed
place of business outside the seller's country of residence. 2 9 The aim of
225. The foreign tax credit depends not only on the fraction of worldwide income derived
from foreign sources, but also on the amount of income derived by the taxpayer and the U.S. tax
that otherwise would be payable.
226. TREASURY 1,supra note 6, at 365. Accord TREASURY II, supra note 6, at 399; see also
Garbarino, supra note 21, at 397.
supra note 6, at.399.
227. TREASURY I, supra note 6, at 365. Accord TREASURY 1I,
228. I.R.C. § 865(a) (1988).
229. I.R.C. § 865(e)(1) (1988). The exception applies to nonresidents of the United States
with respect to all sales of personal property, including inventory property, unless the property is
sold for use, disposition, or consumption outside of the United States, and the taxpayer's foreign
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the rule is to correlate the source of the income with the underlying
selling activity. 30
Admittedly, the new rules are consistent with the articulated Treasury Department principles. The new rules, despite their semantical
symmetry with Treasury Department objectives, however, may operate
in a way that is fundamentally inconsistent with sound taxing policy. In
reality, a sale of goods that have been purchased by the seller for resale
purposes is likely to involve economic activity at numerous locations.
For example, the seller's home office may be located in a different
country from the place where the goods were purchased, where the
marketing activities occur, where the buyer is located, where the goods
will be consumed, or where the seller's relationship with goods is severed. The seller's residence, then, is only one site at which substantive
economic activities pertaining to the sale take place. In fact, if source is
to depend upon economic activities, focusing on passage of risk of loss
may be nearer to reality and more appropriate than a seller's residence
rule, because it focuses on the goods themselves and on the quintessence of the seller's relationship with them, that is, the point at which
the seller no longer maintains any real risks or responsibilities with respect to the goods.
C. A Risk of Loss Passage Rule Is Clear and Readily Applied
A third objective in formulating a sound and useful source rule
might be a rule that is clearly understandable and may be readily applied. " The title passage rule, even where it is understood as a risk of
*loss passage rule, has the advantage of clarity and certainty. By applying pre-U.C.C. concepts, the point of title passage was an easily identifiable event, 2 with commercial, as well as tax,'significance. A plethora
office materially participates in the sale. I.R.C. § 865(c)(2)(B) (1988). See supra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
230. TREASURY 1, supra note 6, at 366; accord TREASURY 11,supra note 6, at 402; H.R.
REP. No. 426, supra note 2, at 360-61.
231. Although this third objective was discussed in the Treasury report, TREASURY 1, supra
note 6, at 365; accord TREASURY 11, supra note 6, at 399, the report did not explicitly contend
that the principle is violated by the title passage rule. See also Garbarino, supra note 21, at 397.
232. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
1964); A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 388 (Ct. Cl. 1960). But see Garbarino, supra note 21, at 404. Although the normative principle is simple, Garbarino concludes that
the title passage rule is difficult to administer. According to Garbarino, adjudication is required on
a case-by-case basis because the rule is not clear when applied in varying fact patterns. Garbarino's conclusion in this regard is unsupported. A review of judicial consideration of the title passage rule indicates that relatively few courts have encountered any difficulties in applying the title
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of statutory rules and judicial interpretations in the commercial area
were available for guidance. Of course, the concept of title in tax cases
suffered from the shortcomings of commercial law.2 33 Under modern
commercial law, however, pre-U.C.C. uncertainties no longer exist, and
2 34
the point of risk of loss passage is both clear and easily identified.
D. A Risk of Loss Passage Rule Is Consistent with Judicial Precedent and Administrative Practice
Both the courts and the I.R.S. have identified risk of loss as the
essential component of ownership. Since the beginning of Stage
Four,23 5 courts almost invariably have mentioned or discussed the passage of risk of loss in lock step with title passage. Recent opinions of
the Tax Court reflect an overt willingness to shift the focus from title
to risk of loss. 23 6 These opinions recognize the attributes of ownership
that reflect economic substance, namely responsibility for the goods and
risk of loss or damage. Why, then, have the courts been reluctant to
completely and explicitly abandon the concept of title? If the courts
overcame their reluctance and recognized openly what they recognize
in substance, then the charade of title passage would be abolished and
risk of loss could find its rightful place in tax law, as it has in commercial law.
The government has itself stressed the importance of risk of loss in
Treasury Regulations. 3 The regulations provide that, notwithstanding
that gains are sourced at the location of title passage, "[w]here bare
legal title is retained by the seller, the sale shall be deemed to have
occurred at the time and place of passage to the buyer of beneficial
ownership and the risk of loss.' '238 A risk of loss passage rule, then, is
consistent with I.R.S. practice.
passage rule to the particular transactions in issue. Where issues have arisen regarding application
of the title passage rule, opinions have tended to focus on whether the title passage rule is the
appropriate test, not on how to apply the title passage rule to the presented facts.
233. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
234. See U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (1987); accord INCOTERMS 1990, supra note 77, at 52-53
(C.I.F. contracts), 38-39 (F.O.B. contracts).
235. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
236. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1167 (1990); Kates Holding
Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 700 (1982); Miami Purchasing Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 818 (1981).
237. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960). The regulation is based on Gen. Couns. Mem.
25,131, 1947-2 C.B. 85.
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960) (emphasis added). Cf. Kates, 79 T.C. at 707. If the
Kates court's construction of the regulation is correct, then perhaps the regulation ought to be
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It is curious that the 1984 Treasury Department report omitted a
discussion of the weight accorded risk of loss by the courts and the
I.R.S. Thus, it is not surprising that the title passage rule, understood
as connoting mere legal title, failed to meet the tax policy objectives
outlined by the Treasury Department. If the title passage rule is understood as connoting a risk of loss passage rule, however, then the Treasury Department's tax policy principles would be satisfied.
V.

CONCLUSION

The courts already have recognized that risk of loss is the predominant component of title. The Tax Court has even attempted to incorporate U.C.C. risk of loss concepts into title passage analyses. It is now
time for the courts to take the next step by acknowledging explicitly
that passage of risk of loss alone ought to determine the source of gains
in international sales of personal property. It is not necessary to handcuff title and risk of loss together in legal discussions of source of income. Rather, risk of loss may be dealt with discretely and in its own
right, supported by legal precedent and logic. The government's recent
interest in litigating the title passage rule may represent the start of
another effort to overturn title passage rule precedents in favor of a
"final acts" analysis. 39 If so, courts will soon have a clear opportunity
once and for all to set matters right and to embrace and adopt a risk of
loss passage rule.
It is likely that Congress again will consider a total repeal of the
title passage rule, in light of revenue estimates 40 and the Treasury Department's impending study. 4 ' Congress should recognize that the
Treasury Department's 1984 repeal proposal was premised upon a misunderstanding of the title passage rule. The title passage rule in fact
encompasses a risk of loss passage rule, under which determinations of
source of income reflect the economic substance of underlying international sales transactions. When viewed in proper historical context, the
title passage rule is consistent with international tax policy objectives,
and a total repeal is not warranted.
rewritten to place primary, if not exclusive, importance on passage of risk of loss.
239. See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. Of course, a repeal could be justified solely
on the basis of financial concerns.
241. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

